Economic Liberalisation Reforms and Growth

CHAPTER 1stagnation. According to them, the foundation for
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUNDhigher growth have been laid by liberalising the
Economists through out the world are searching formarkets, broad tax and tariff reforms, financial
what really are the major determinants of growth ofsector reforms and by privatising the state
an economy and different policies have been used inenterprises. The key element in the
pursuit of the answers. The world as large has gonegovernment’s programme has been the
through a lot of economic problems, such asreduction of inflation, which has fallen from 200
depressions of 1930s, 1970s and 1980s. The 1930percent in 1990 to 20 percent in 1997. This helped
depression led to employing of the Keynesian policiesthe GDP to grow by 6.4 percent in 1996/7 period.
of strict government intervention. However, theThis dissertation investigates whether there are
1970s depression made policy makers lose faith ingenuine reasons behind economic liberalisation and
Keynesian economics. Nevertheless, most Thirdrelated austerity measures, using Zambia as the case
World countries continued with their central planningstudy, by describing and comparing its economic
type of economic policies. There was strongperformance before and after liberalisation. We then
disenchantment with this type of policies, which leduse panel data and cross-section regression analysis
growing number of economists and influentialon selected African countries to see if the
international development organisations to begin, ineconometric analysis results support the calls for
recent years, to advocate the increased use of theliberalisation measures. The dissertation is organised
market mechanism that is to liberalise the markets,as follows Chapter 1 has provided introduction and
as the key instrument of promoting greatertheoretical background to economic liberalisation. In
efficiency. In this regard economic liberalisation implieschapter 2, Zambia’s detailed account of its
minimisation of government intervention in allocatingpre-liberalisation economic policies is presented.
economic resources and letting the market forcesChapter 3 looks at post-liberalisation economic policies
play the cardinal role, doing away with all forms ofof the country. Chapter 4 presents econometric
government distortions in running the economy. Theanalysis and empirical results, and Chapter 5 concludes
market forces should play a leading role in financial,the findings. It should be borne in mind that this study
trade, labour, commodity markets and other sectors,is not about the direct measurement of the effects
increasing reliance in market forces is normallyof liberalisation policies on economic performance. This
accompanied by stabilisation programs, (Kruegeris due to the problems cited by Kirkpatrick (1995) and
1978,1985).the unavailability of many of the data required for
There has been an increasing call for the privateundertaking a more detailed study of the country.
sector to take up the challenges of nationalCHAPTER 2
development. According to Robert Barro (1996),THE PRE-LIBERALISATION ECONOMIC POLICIES OF
most empirical facts point to primacy of governmentZAMBIA
choices; countries that have pursued broadly freeZambia’s economic history traces back to the
market policies, in particular trade liberalisation andcolonial era. Zambia a former British colony was
maintenance of secure property rights, haveknown as Northern Rhodesia. The British’s
experienced higher growth, than those which pursuemain emphasis was the mining of copper, which they
central planning type of policies. For this reason, thereexported as a raw material. Zambia obtained
have been calls for the privatisation programs.independence on 24 October 1964 with an economy
On the other hand Rodrik, (1992) argues that tradecharacterised by an industrial enclave based on
reforms is frequently met with scepticism on the partcopper mining using British and USA capital (Hawkins,
of the private sector and may lack support, the1991). During this time there was little or no significant
country implementing them suffers from terms ofinvestment apart from the mining sector, and before
trade deterioration which may result into reduction ofindependence most of the copper profits were
capital inflow and increase capital flights. He goes onexpatriated and very little was re-invested. However,
to say that this is coupled with inflation and low zeroin the first years of independence 1964-69 the
growth. Krueger (1978) points out that to avoid this,economy unfolded and great progress was recorded
appropriate macroeconomic policies need to(Turok, 1979). The country had a GDP per capita
accompany the increase in price of foreign exchangethat was amongst the highest in Africa; according to
(devaluation), or else domestic inflation would soarTurok, 1979, it was just below that of South Africa.
and affect the intended benefits of liberalisation. ThatCopper prices were high and the industry was
is why stabilisation programs, such as reduction inprofitable, so every indication was towards rapid
government expenditures, accompany liberalisation bygrowth and development. The economy was more
cutting on government consumption, which is oftenof a capitalist than a state led.
negatively related to the growth of an economy.2.1-Post-Independence Economic Reforms
However Wha Lee (1993)’s findings in theFew years after independence in 1968 and 1969,
case of Korea are very interesting, Korea gavePresident Kaunda, with the then ruling United Nation
subsidies to some firms manufacturing exports,Independence Party (UNIP), initiated reforms.
managed to grow faster. He argues that theAccording to him, this was to lead state control of
theoretical predictions about the link between growththe whole economy to enhance growth and equal
and open trade may be ambiguous and misleading.distribution of income. It was also aimed at
According to critics, tariffs can either enhance orempowering the indigenous people to control and
decrease growth rates, depending on which sector isdecide the destiny of their country’s
protected. This is the argument of infant industry.economy. This was characterised by developmentalist
Krueger (1985) notes that LDCs have beenphilosophy (command economy) and recognition of
protecting infant industries for decades, but theypolitical realities (Turok, 1979).
have still remained infants; this is an indication thatThe 1968 and 1969 Mulungushi and Matero economic
there is something wrong with the economics ofreforms were meant to repossess the foreign
protectionism. Nevertheless Wha Lee (1993) noteseconomic and business interests, which now became
that since the current theory of liberalisation isunder the state control. The UNIP government also
inconclusive, as is the empirical evidence, the linkintroduced indigenous import substitutions in the
between trade policy and dynamic efficiency isindustrial sector, this was aimed at reduction in the
vague, depending on the industry considered.dependence on foreign manufactured goods.
Kirkpatrick (1995) argues that the orthodoxAlthough a small indigenous and foreign private sector
arguments concerning the role of trade policy as thewas left, a large public sector was created and
determinant of industrial performance are seen in themaintained by copper revenue and protected and
major role of creating price incentives. This issupported by government controlled markets. As a
because liberalisation and a neutral incentivesresult of the state controlled type of the economy,
structure between import substituting and exportwhich emphasised the creation of industrial capacity,
activities is expected to yield both static and dynamiccommercial agriculture perished and the private sector
effects, static in form of technical efficiency andwas crowded out.
dynamic in the form of switching process. However,According to Turok(1979), it is commonly accepted
many models, both for planning and explaining thethat the weaknesses of the economy, which levelled
development process, according to Krueger (1978),off in 1972 and then began declining, cannot be solely
have made a foreign exchange central toblamed on the falling copper prices, though this might
determination of the growth rates. This focus is onhave been one of the contributing factors. This is
the role of foreign exchange (forex) inbecause, even by 1974 before the collapse of
complementing domestic savings needed to supportcopper prices, foreign exchange had started posing a
domestic investment. The effect on economicserious constraint on economic development. A major
growth will be via an increased volume of exportsexplanation lies in the economic policies of the day.
and reduced imports due to liberalisation andDespite its inheritance of highly concentrated and
devaluation respectively. It is argued that if tradingbuoyant foreign owned mining enclave, the Zambian
partners removed tariffs, we expect the market togovernment was determined to use the state for
expand which will ultimately lead to growth ofdevelopment. The state sector share of
exports. Exports are also viewed as a stimulus tomanufacturing output was growing almost every
greater capacity utilisation, greater horizontalyear. Four years after Mulungushi reforms in 1968, in
specialisation, increased familiarity with absorption ofwhich the government announced its acquisition of
new technologies transmitted through trade, greatermajor companies it was 53 percent of total
learning by doing, as a result of the increased marketmanufacturing output and this was concentrated on
size and output levels and stimulation effects ofessential consumer goods required by Zambia.
having to achieve international price and quality.However, despite its size and scope, the state
Expanded market economies of scale enable asector which included parastatals had not established
producer to cast or spread a “net”an integrated economy with forward and backward
widely on various consumers who may be helpful bylinkages, parastatals, though they were import
sending back comments on how to improve thesubstitution industries (ISI) deeply depended on
quality of the products. Since tariffs tend to beessential inputs from abroad. The government
reactionary, if a country adopt liberalisation policies, itsintervened extensively and imposed a number of
trading partners will also do away with tariffs therestrictions on the private sector, while
moment one country scraps trade restrictions, so theparastatals’ decisions were made by political
market size will expand.leaders and ministers who sat on their boards. The
However, Trade liberalisation alone is not an answer.parastatals were to be organised on lines of the
For this to be successful, there is a need to liberalisecountry’s philosophy of
the financial sector, so that exporters can have‘Humanism’, which was coined by the
ready capital for re-investment; nuisance taxes havePresident as an African socialism. There was
to go, so that most of the foreign exchange earningsintervention in pricing policy, which seemed to be
are retained by the exporters. This creates incentivesconcerned more with social welfare than with
to them. Macroeconomic stabilisation also has to bepursuing economic development goals.
enforced so that inflation will not impede planning, andIn 1970, barely two years after the Mulungushi and
if this creates confidence in investors, exports shouldMatero reforms capital expenditure was only growing
increase.at a marginal increase, while consumption expenditure
Pro-liberalisation economists have argued that moresoared. Table 2.1 shows the higher government
open economies are more efficient in absorbingconsumption and lower gross domestic consumption
exogenously generated innovations, since, withoutfrom 1964-90. Due to little emphasis which was made
barriers, not only will this increase the volumes ofon capital expenditure, in 1973, value added in
essential imports, but it will also facilitate the entry ofmanufacturing recorded only a marginal increase from
new technology which developing countries are able106 Million Kwacha to only 107.5 Million Kwacha in
to absorb and assimilate easily in order to expand1976, compared to 480 Million Kwacha in 1965 a year
their manufacturing base. Edwards (1992), findsafter independence (GRZ Economic Report, 1977).
strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that, withValue added by manufacturing in 1978 real terms was
other things being equal, more liberal economies tend15 percent lower than 1974. Hence by the mid 1970s,
to grow faster than those which are not. He calls thisthe bells of economic doom were loud enough in
learning by doing type of process, “technicalpoliticians’ ears, but pretended to be deaf.
progress ” where more contact with newThey instead nurtured and guarded the inefficient
commodities and technology enhances efficiency,parastatals and the command economy. To make
which result in higher production. He argues that if thethe situation worse, some more parastatals were
rate of technical progress is positively affected bycreated and added to the list of inefficiency. After
the gap between the stock of the world and1970, a substantial part of Zambia’s economy
domestic knowledge with respect to the foreignwas dominated by parastatal organisation, about 60
source of technological improvement, then thepercent of the economy in terms of GDP was now
country’s ability to appropriate world technicalin parastatal hands. Most larger companies which had
innovations depends positively on the degree ofbeen run and owned by foreigners came under
economic trade liberalisation. Therefore more opengovernment control through Industrial Development
economies have an advantage of absorbing newCorporation (INDECO), an agency of a government
ideas from the rest of the world. He finds thatholding company.
countries with more open and less distortive tradeThese newly nationalised companies were especially
policies have tended to grow faster than those withactive in such industries as food processing, textiles,
more restrictive commercial policies. His results are inauto assembly and mining. Through large- scale
conformity with the catch up theory effect. Whacapitalisation, using copper revenue, these parastatals
Lee (1992), points out that international trade isbecame the pillar of the Zambian formal sector. They
perceived as a vehicle through which foreign inputsemployed 1/3 of the workforce and maintained their
are provided to domestic production. According toemployment levels even during the recession, for
him trade distortions caused by tariffs and exchangepolitical reasons. For instance during recession, the
rate controls decrease the long run growth ratesnumber of employees in private manufacturing fell
more significantly in a country that needs to importfrom 27,370 to 23,390 in 1977, about 14.5 percent
more.reductions, while in the parastatals they remained
Therefore, it can be summarised that liberalisationconstant over the same period (Turok, 1979). In
enhances international trade which providesthese parastatal bodies there were rampant and
comparative advantage and also provides ancontinuing reports of corruption, inefficiency and
additional source of competition to domestic firms.mismanagement, but government decided to give it a
Subsidies to ailing industries, no matter how muchdeaf ear. The Kayope Commission (1976), revealed
they may alleviate economic distress in the short run,catastrophic failures in major parastatals and
represent an effort to decelerate growth, reducewidespread misappropriation of funds, but still the
incentives for mobility and lock in resources in thegovernment shelved the report, and continued to
inefficient industries that should contract in thegive subsidies and protection to these inefficient
process of economic growth.parastatals. Real Gross domestic fixed investment
However, there is a problem of measuring thedeclined as there was no significant capital formation.
benefits of trade liberalisation, which even KirkpatrickThe emphasis was put on government consumption
(1995) acknowledged. Kirkpatrick admits thatwhile the economy continued to decline. This can be
measuring of trade liberalisation benefits is a difficultseen in the decrease in capital expenditure which fell
and frustrating task. It involves two considerablein 1979 to its lowest since independence in 1964 as
methodological problems; it is important to assess theTable 2.1 shows. This shows that INDECO, on which
extent to which the World Bank’s conditionsthe government relied as agency of intervention was
have been adopted. This is because most of theperforming poorly.
liberalisation policies of LDCs are not unilaterallyAt independence, Zambia’s economy had poor
adopted, but imposed, and therefore may lackfoundation, domestic production supplied less than
consistency. The other problem is the assessment ofone third of the local market for manufactured
the reforms that were implemented. It is complicatedgoods, while total manufacturing goods accounted for
by problems of separating causality from association.only 6 percent, the same setting continued even 10
According to him, it is difficulty to establish counteryears after independence, domestic economy was
factual, and separating out the effect of multiplenot integrated lacking forward and backward linkages.
influences on economic performance.In trying to enhance domestic integration the
Larry Sjaastad (1982) noted that the economicgovernment after its 1968 Mulungushi and 1969
liberalisation that swept Southern cone during theMatero economic reforms bought out the private
1970s and 1980s was a clear reaction to the failuresshare holders in INDECO which was established in
of preceding economics of protectionism. Uruguay1965, but reinforced after these reforms, and
and Argentina, once prosperous nations had fallen onobtained a larger share of profits from copper by
hard times by the mid 1970s. Real per capita incomemeans of higher taxation, which was then used for
in Uruguay had been declining at a rate of 1 percentpublic investment.
in 20 years. Chile, though never a prosperous
country, was crippled with a continuos fiscal deficit
and an inflation of 1000 percent. Their economies
were characterised by inefficient state enterprises,
which despite massive tariff protection, regularly
required subsidies to sustain their operating loses.TABLE 2.1: GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION IN
Price controls, tariffs, subsidies and export taxesCOMPARISON TO GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED
severely distorted relative prices with much of theINVESTMENT 1964-90 (IN KWACHA MILLION)
private enterprises devoted to production of luxuryYear Government consumption Gross domestic
goods. Regulatory bodies administered import dutiesfixedinvestment
and quotas, interest rates, credit allocation and1964
wages. The monetary and financial sectors were309.2
dominated by the state banks with special rediscount76.2
privileges at the central bank. Their economies were1965
in a bad state. Therefore all these countries383.4
introduced liberalisation programmes in the1980s, but120.4
their results were disastrous. The Southern cone1966
experiences, according to Sjaastad (1982) are widely435.8
interpreted as evidence of the failure of economic175.8
liberalisation.1967
Zambia like Argentina, Uruguay and Chile had almost558
the same type of economic policies, with nationalised225.8
economy before the liberalisation program which1968
swept the country in 1991. Its economy was594
characterised by inefficient state enterprises with264.7
massive tariff protection in order to enhance import1969
substitution industries. Price controls, nuisance custom589.4
duties, subsidies on production and consumption,253.6
export taxes, foreign exchange controls. Private1970
enterprises had to declare all their export earnings to717.5
the central bank, as it was illegal to hold forex.279.8
Zambia, before privatisation and liberalisation, had1971
regulatory bodies to administer import quotas,801.9
interest rates, credit allocation and wages. All the264.7
macroeconomic factors were determined by political1972
decree. The monetary and financial arenas were857.3
dominated by the state banks, with special rediscount381.1
privileges to the Bank of Zambia. According to the1973
advocates of the liberal markets, poor rates of900.7
growth, massive inflation and balance of payment426
problems experienced by LDCs, and Zambia in1974
particular, during the 1970s and 1980s were because1083.1
of the rising burden of public spending through560
parastatal companies, excessive price distortion and1975
inward looking trade policies which are the order of1241.8
the day in the planned economy.510
Zambia today, according to the World Bank Report1976
(December, 1997), has the most liberal and least1337
nationalised economy in Africa. In 1991, more than 80483
percent of the economy measured as a percentage1977
of GDP was state owned. Now, as at 1997, more1547.8
than 80 percent of the economy is in private hands.437
The one party state, which ruled Zambia since1978
independence in 1964 from the British, chose the1789.3
path of nationalisation and centralisation. According to450
the World Bank report (Dec., 1997), this was ruinous.1979
The government and international organisations such2045.6
as the World Bank and IMF believe that65.8
macroeconomic stability and growth are being1980
achieved after years of inflation and decades of2473.