Trade Policy Committee

The Trade Policy Committee works to build consensus on trade matters to convey them to lawmakers and regulators on issues affect the Pacific Northwest trade community. Its programs include hosting government and business leaders, drafting and reviewing trade legislation, and sponsoring trade luncheons and breakfast programs.

Chair:

Vice-Chair:

Walt Evans, Attorney, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt

Monica Isbell, President, Starboard Alliance Company

2003 Trade Issues

PNITA promotes a non-partisan view of international trade. PNITA’s policies reflect the interests and consensus of our members that support global competitiveness under a fair and equitable trading system.

The Global Trading System

PNITA supports the efforts of this Administration and its predecessor to expand bilateral and multilateral trade discussions to increase economic opportunities for all global citizens. We support as the goal of US trade policy to raise the standard of living for Americans by increasing exports of goods and services and through lower prices for imported alternatives to domestic products, while protecting American workers and farmers from unfair trading practices of foreign competitors. We also support providing education, training and transition assistance to Americans displaced by adverse economic impacts linked directly to imports. Trade benefits Americans and should be promoted vigorously.

PNITA also embraces actions through the trade negotiation process that ensure democratic freedoms, environmental stewardship, and adequate living standards for all parties. Safeguards to ensure environmental, labor and human rights standards are important and should be given a consultative role in the process. Linking trade sanctions to US international trade agreements as a means to achieve these objectives, however, is a less effective strategy.

2003 Key Issues

WTO global trade negotiations. PNITA believes the US needs to follow through actively on the initiatives launched at the Doha Round. WTO trade negotiations are important to the US and the global economy. It also is critical that the WTO improves its transparency rules and dispute resolution processes to maintain public support for its important role and mission. Benefits of a new round will help remove remaining barriers to trade and investment, and will address issues resulting from technological and scientific developments of the past decade.

Regional and Bilateral Trade Arrangements: PNITA believes that free-trade agreements, such as the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) and the US- Singapore Trade Agreement, are important means to pursuing market-opening strategies with major trading partners. US companies and workers shouldn’t be disadvantaged while other countries continue to negotiate preferential trade deals. PNITA has a regional interest in the FTAA initiative, as Pacific Northwest workers and businesses seek to expand beyond their traditional Asian and European markets.

Agricultural Barriers: PNITA supports US efforts to improve global access to food and the free flow of trade in agricultural goods and products. PNITA also supports US efforts to remove trade-distorting policies and practices of our trading partners that hamper US agriculture exports. In order to enhance the stability and predictability of world food markets, PNITA members support the elimination of foreign tariffs, and State Trade Enterprises, reduction in export subsidies, and greater disciplines in the use of export restrictions or bans on agricultural products.

General Agreement on Trade Services (GATS): PNITA supports US efforts to establish a multilateral, legally enforceable agreement covering trade and investment in services. The GATS will help to reduce or eliminate foreign governmental measures preventing US-based services companies from foreign discrimination by locally established service firms. In the US, service industries account for nearly 80 percent of US employment and Gross Domestic Product. An open and competitive global service markets is good for the US economy and will help grow the world economy.

THE US TRADING SYSTEM

PNITA believes that US leadership is essential in the global economy. We must pursue trade, tax, investment, and economic policies that encourage domestic and international growth. These efforts should reflect sound trade policy strategies, and avoid market-restrictive actions when ever possible.

Unilateral Sanction Reform: PNITA believes that US unilateral trade sanctions rarely achieve their goals, and have not been an efficient or effective means of obtaining trade policy compliance by the foreign country. US-imposed sanctions often make it difficult for US goods and services to stay competitive when they are forced to cede valuable ground to competitors. In lieu of unilateral sanctions, the US should work with its allies to resolve differences through multilateral venues.

Protectionist Pressures: PNITA supports an open trading system including enforcement of US trade laws that protect against predatory dumping and aggressive export subsidies employed by our trading partners. Such US laws, however, must not be protectionist measures camouflaged as “fair trade” laws. PNITA also cautions our trading partners that exporting to and selling within the US is not an absolute right. Our trading partners should not be allowed to abuse their access to our markets through egregious distortions of our markets via dumping and subsidies.

POLICY PAPER ON U.S. PORT AND BORDER SECURITY

The Pacific Northwest International Trade Association (PNITA) supports federal initiatives that attempt to protect U.S. citizens from terrorist acts within U.S. borders. Our members have been active in reviewing their international supply chains, and we would like to offer our resources to assist government agencies in the development of effective port and maritime security legislation.

All branches of government, along with various federal agencies are currently engaged in serious discussions concerning how to protect U.S. citizens and property from terrorist acts. The movement of inbound ocean containers into the U.S. is viewed by many as being a potential area of vulnerability. Security concerns extend to port and marine facilities as well.

Given the volume of container trade into this country, the challenges that we collectively face in applying a safety shield over maritime trade is daunting. Nevertheless, the membership of PNITA believes that through the legislative process, policies can be enacted that can achieve the desired result of a more secure maritime infrastructure while maintaining an efficient system for the movement of goods.

For this to occur, the PNITA membership believes coordination among federal agencies is critical in order to prevent confusion over jurisdiction and regulatory authority. For security initiatives to be effective, a comprehensive program will need to be established in order to minimize redundancies and ensure that mandated security initiatives provide the intended results i.e., identifying potentially high-risk containers as early in the import process as possible in order to prevent terrorist acts from occurring within our borders.

The legislative processes specific to port security are now underway. The Senate recently passed the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 (S. 1214) and the House is rushing through comparable port security legislation (H.R. 3983). Each has elements in common, but also diverge in scope and content on a number of substantive issues. Additionally, U.S. Customs has established the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism Initiative (C-TPAT) intended to encourage the various parties in the supply chain to improve security processes. In addition, U.S. Customs’ Container Security Initiative (CSI) is designed to address the vulnerability of cargo containers to terrorist actions through pre-screening and analysis of shipping data.

Though these are all very important initiatives, they have largely been undertaken without ample input from importers and service providers, both of whom have intimate knowledge on how supply chains operate and what measures might work best based on government objectives and priorities.

It is safe to assume that all importers wish to secure their supply chains as much as possible to prevent a catastrophe from happening. Many importers already have good procedures in place to accomplish this, and the federal government should encourage others to implement appropriate measures. There is, however, no magic fix for the potentially dangerous environment in which we now find ourselves. The situation is highly complex and fluid. But there is an opportunity to improve our cargo security system through effective legislation. PNITA members have been closely following the legislative process and the new security initiatives put forward by federal agencies such as the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs. In an effort to contribute to this process and provide informed solutions, PNITA members have developed the accompanying analysis, which outlines most of the initiatives already put forward in Washington D.C. The analysis contains PNITA’s recommended enhancements and alternative strategies the government may wish to consider as the port and maritime security debate unfolds.

U.S. PORT AND BORDER SECURITY ANALYSIS

Government Initiative One

Require importers to secure their supply chain.

Issues

· Shipments pass through many hands prior to arrival at final destination (e.g. factory, trucker, consolidator, trucker, origin port, vessel, destination port, trucker, railroad, trucker, distribution center, etc.). It is impossible for the importer to know every party in its supply chain who has access to shipments and certify these parties use security-based procedures.

Recommendations

· The government should encourage importers to obtain as much intimate knowledge of the entities within their supply chain as possible and encourage them to use good security procedures. It is not realistic, however, to mandate strict policies, especially ones that would result in major new costs for importers and logistics service providers. The reality is that, in many countries, factories have no fences, employee badge and security systems, and the like. Importers can do their best to do business with reliable, "known" factories and logistics service providers, but cannot force these parties to enhance security policies without incurring dramatically higher product and freight costs.

Government Initiative Two

Push back U.S. borders to the point of cargo origin so all U.S.-bound containers can be x-rayed or inspected before loading at the foreign port. Allow cargo from the ten largest mega-ports around the world deemed to be more security-conscious by the federal government to move more freely. Restrict entry into the U.S. of cargo from ports deemed to have security issues unless risk assessments have been performed.

Issues

· It is physically and logistically impossible to passively or actively inspect or x-ray all inbound containers either at origin ports or at U.S. ports without a huge disruption in international commerce.

· Ocean carriers have vessel schedules and routes in place that are responsive to economic imperatives, and thus, cargo cannot easily be funneled through the ten largest mega-ports.

· The ten mega-ports cannot possibly x-ray and inspect a dramatically increased volume of containers because there is insufficient space in which to do so. Gridlock would occur almost immediately.

· Ships cannot be completely unloaded and reloaded for the purposes of inspection without a dramatic increase in transit time and cost to importers.

· Foreign mega-ports may not choose to follow U.S. dictated security standards.

· The federal government has not clarified how transshipped cargo will be treated.

Recommendations

· The government should utilize existing shipping documents and the document screening processes contained in the existing U.S. Customs Automated Commercial System (ACS) Selectivity Module to target irregularities prior to vessel arrival at the first port of call. Suspicious containers can be off-loaded and quickly moved to a secure area for inspection. For example, irregularities could include: a) situations where an importer who normally fully declares its products lists the cargo description on a particular container as Freight All Kinds (FAK), b) occasionswhen an importer’s container is on board an ocean carrier for which that importer does not have a contract on file with the Federal Maritime Commission, c) when transit time is longer or shorter than normal, d) when the stated weight of the container is different from the actual weight, and e) when the container is shipped from an unusual country of origin for that importer. New processes and procedures would have to be established to obtain and record actual weights of loaded containers as well as other information so comparisons can be made. By using risk assessment, not every container would have to be inspected.

· As an interim step, funds and resources should be allocated to programming enhancements to the ACS Selectivity Module to improve risk assessment capabilities until U.S. Customs’ new Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) system is operational several years from now. Merchandise Processing Fees (MPF) collectedfrom importers during the customs clearance process should be dedicated to U.S. Customs initiatives, particularly system enhancements, rather than being diverted to other government programs.

· Funding and resources should be allocated in order to more rapidly complete the ACE system, which is designed, in part, to improve cargo screening and risk assessment. A component of the ACE system is the International Trade Data System (ITDS). The ITDS database is designed to be shared with other enforcement agencies. Requiring that various federal agencies coordinate their efforts to improve security processes would be a positive step.

· Cargo volume will increase as international trade increases in the future, so security procedures and solutions must take this into account.

Government Initiative Three

Mandate that foreign ports abide by U.S. security standards.

Issues

· There will be reluctance on the partof some foreign governments and ports to cooperate fully with U.S. security requirements. Some may be willing, but unable to comply, due to insufficient funds or commercial reasons.

· The skill level and integrity of the work force in foreign ports charged to police container contents might be suspect. Can the U.S. government ensure these foreign workers are not corrupt or inefficient? A false sense of security will prevail if the government assumes that since a container was inspected at origin, the examination was adequate and no risk remains.

Recommendations

· Cooperating with foreign governments to improve port, container and vessel security procedures is necessary and could work best in coordination with such international entities as the International Maritime Organization, as S. 1214 authorizes, the World Shipping Council and the World Customs Organization.

· Establishing international standards for port vulnerability assessment and security improvements is a far better approach than working unilaterally.

Government Initiative Four

For risk assessment purposes, require detailed container content data to be transmitted to a government agency 24 hours prior to vessel loading at origin.

Issues

· Vendor commercial documents, such as vendor packing lists and visas, fully detailing container contents are often not available until after vessel departure from origin, and sometimes not until close to time of customs clearance, particularly if the cargo is moving under a visa.

· Due to late production, shippers and consolidators often load cargo and deliver containers to ocean carriers very close to the carrier’s cut-off time, and sometimes while the vessel is being loaded. So container content information could not be provided 24 hours in advance of vessel loading without the container missing the intended vessel. This could increase the necessity for airfreight, resulting in much higher costs for the importer, as well subject the shipper to additional fees for resubmitting export documentation to the foreign government with the new mode of transport.

· Ocean carriers generally release original bills of lading to shippers and cargo consolidators 24 to 48 hours after vessel sailing. Currently, ocean carriers must transmit the Inbound Foreign Manifest (IFM) vessel manifest data to U.S. Customs 48 hours prior to arrival at the first U.S. port of call. Generally, carriers only have all the necessary shipment details available from shippers approximately 72 hours after vessel departure from origin. Requiring ocean carriers to transmit manifest data prior to vessel departure would be burdensome for the carriers and the data might not be reliable.

· Ocean carriers may do everything possible to shift the reporting responsibility onto shippers or importers since they would be the only parties who potentially have the required information so early in the process.

· The government has not clearly defined which agency will collect such data, which party must provide it (i.e. shipper, importer, ocean carrier, NVOCC, freight forwarder, or customs broker), if and how it will be shared with other agencies, and how it will be kept confidential. Language in the various bills and initiatives varies.

· No procedure has been outlined in case the risk assessment determines that a container has suspicious contents, (i.e. should the ocean carrier be prevented from loading the container on the vessel?).

· Dangerous cargo could be introduced into containers without the knowledge of the importer despite their efforts to secure their supply chains.

· Terrorists will not properly describe dangerous cargo on documents.

· Requiring cargo description data down to the six-digit Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) code for risk assessment purposes is unnecessary.

· If the ocean carrier is required to transmit data to a government agency early in the shipment process and the data is wrong, the importer will be held liable for such erroneous declarations, and may be subject to penalties and fines. Importers are better able to furnish accurate details later in the process.

· Cargo delays will occur, thereby disrupting the flow of commerce. Importers will have to add time to their manufacturing process, thereby increasing inventory levels.

Recommendations

· Use risk-based decision-making tools designed to thwart terrorist actions while ensuring that legitimate cargo is not delayed.

· Require all ocean carriers to transmit IFM vessel manifest information to U.S. Customs via the Automated Manifest System (AMS) five to seven days prior to vessel arrival at a U.S. port.The IFM contains data including shipper, consignee, container number, bill of lading number, number of pieces, shipment weight and cube, commodity description, origin, destination, and discharge port. This should be sufficient to determine risk. A longer term strategy would be for all cargo information to be entered directly into the ACE system, creating a single source for all cargo details.

· Require that shippersfurnish only the following data elements to the ocean carriers for transmission to U.S. Customs via AMS. This data must normally be provided to their government in order to be allowed to export: a) Manufacturer’s Identification Number (MID#) or Shipper’s Identification Number (SID#), b) description of product, and c) first port of loading. Transmitting cargo description to the two-digit, universally-recognized, HTS chapter level is sufficient to determine risk. For example, what purpose does it serve for U.S. Customs to know if a garment is either for a man or woman, knit or woven, shirt or blouse, cotton or other material? To determine security risk factors, the government really only needs to know the commodity is a garment, which is identified in the first two digits of the HTS chapter. Simple commodity descriptions should be sufficient.

· Cargo data that may be required by shippers or carriers and/or their agents that is not intended for use by U.S. Customs for applying duty should not include detailed HTS information.

· In order to pre-screen cargo prior to vessel arrival at a U.S. port, while recognizing the confidential nature of the information, U.S. Customs should share the data it requireswith other government agencies on a need-to-know basis.

· Since a cargo database already exists because ocean carriers provide ship manifest information to U.S. Customs via the AMS system, duplicate cargo databases are not needed. Rather, cargo content detail and submission timelines should be reviewed in order to make this information available to enforcement agencies earlier in the supply chain whenever possible. This approach would require that the AMS database, now under the authority of U.S. Customs, be shared with agencies tasked with enforcement of maritime security.

Government Initiative Five

H.R. 3983 mandates that container content data must be transmitted to a new "anti-terrorism cargo identification system" 24 hours prior to vessel loading. The identification system is to be developed by the Department of Transportation by to June 30, 2003.

Issues

· Developing an alternative system is a waste of tax dollars and will take too long to develop and become effective.

· Staffing to monitor, scan, and identify potentially hazardous containers detected by this new system will take time to implement.

Recommendations

· Development of U.S. Customs’ ACE system is underway. Data needed to accomplish security risk assessment could easily be transmitted to ACE. The government should appropriate funds needed to rapidly complete work on ACE, rather than develop a redundant system.

· Additional features to create exception reports for irregularities should be incorporated into ACE.

Government Initiative Six

The U.S. Customs in-bond process will be restricted.

Issues

· U.S. Customs wants to require more detail relating to the shipment prior to vessel arrival at the first port of discharge rather than, as is the current practice,when the customs entry is filed after the cargo has moved in-bond to its final destination. An important reason importers use the existing in-bond process is because certain documents and information about the shipment may not be available at time of discharge. The importer needs extra time while the container is transiting across the U.S. in which to obtain this data for customs clearance.

· The Hollings Bill requires some of the some information that is currently required to file an entry to clear U.S. Customs. But the additional information being asked for, i.e., first 6-digits of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule and country of origin, may not be available prior to the container’s arrival at the discharge port. This means these containers will have to be ‘parked’ at the discharge port until the importer can furnish all required information to the ocean carrier for execution of the in-bond move. Since no system is in place to transmit this additional information to the ocean carrier for submission to U.S. Customs, and because the information required would generally be the same as for the final entry, the importer will chose to clear all containers at discharge port. This will exacerbate congestion at the discharge port, increase the workload of U.S. Customs at the discharge port, increase container storage charges for importers, and eliminate the ocean carriers’ effective and efficient process of moving containers to inland destinations under their U.S. Customs bond.

· U.S. Customs does not allow pre-clearance of quota items, which means the container must be physically unloaded from the vessel prior to the customs entry being processed and cleared.

· The six-digit HTS code is subject to differing interpretations by the country of origin, the U.S. government, the shipper and importer. HTS code assignments can also be unreliable if provided by a party other than the importer of record.

· S. 1214 requires that the name of theconsignor (i.e. shipper) be provided prior to vessel arrival at the port of discharge. If the shipment was consolidated at origin, this consignor information is unknown to the ocean carrier. The country of origin is also required and can be confused with the country of export.These may not be the same as the country where the product was actually manufactured.

Recommendations

· The SID# or MID# code, which identify the party that tendered the cargo, is currently provided to U.S. Customs and can be part of risk assessment.

· The government should allow the in-bond program to continue with the MID# or SID# and two-digit HTS chapter code information now provided by ocean carriers to U.S. Customs via the AMS.

· U.S. Customs could change their rule to allow pre-clearance of quota cargo so that importers could present the required information for the entry to be processed in advance of vessel arrival at the discharge port.

Government Initiative Seven

Allow the Secretary of Transportation to restrict cargo or deny access to vessels carrying cargo from foreign ports that have been deemed to not be in compliance with effective counterterrorism measures.

Issues

· Not permitting a vessel to berth at a U.S. port due to a perceived risk or lack of information provided in advance about a particular shipment impedes the ability of importers to carry on business in a timely and cost-effective manner. This could have wide-spread negative implications on the U.S. economy.

Recommendations

· Instead of denying berthing rights and impacting all companies who have cargo onboard a vessel that the government has determined came from a port with substandard security practices, the government should use sound cargo risk assessment procedures.

· Practical procedures should be developed to deal with suspicious containers both at port of origin and port of destination. For example, foreign governments could develop and enhance existing methods of identifying suspect containers and not allow them to be loaded on vessels.

· It will be extremely difficult for the government to receive container content transmissions on every container loaded onboard a vessel prior to vessel departure from origin. 100% compliance is not a realistic goal. Each vessel arriving in the U.S. contains cargo from hundreds or thousands of importers. H.R. 3983 mandates that if data has not been transmitted for each shipment on that vessel, the Secretary of Transportation can deny entry to the U.S. of the vessel.

· Procedures should be in place to promptly remove the suspect container from the vessel after berthing and take it to a secure area for inspection, while allowing the balance of containers to move unimpeded.

Government Initiative Eight

Require that U.S. ports do security assessments and upgrade their facilities and practices.

Issues

· Port directors want to comply with government-mandated security enhancements, but these can be very expensive and take time to implement.

Recommendations

· Federal and state governments should quickly appropriate funds to ports sufficient for them to make the necessary improvements.

· The Coast Guard should be the lead agency in establishing physical port security guidelines and analyzing which ports are most at risk.

· Port assessments should be shared with foreign ports in order to build momentum for an international standard on port security assessment.

Government Initiative Nine

Mandate the use of high-tech container seals and container tampering detection devices.

Issues

· Seals are a deterrent, but are not tamper-proof. Thieves in Asia have proven their ability to remove container doors, steal product, and reattach the doors, all without disrupting the integrity of the seal.

Recommendations

· Importers should use cable seals, global positioning systems (GPS) devices, and container tampering detection devices that are currently marketed.

· The World Shipping Council supports the government establishing: a) a legal requirement that shippers must seal a container originating in or destined to the U.S. and record the seal number on all shipping documents, b) a requirement that the party receiving the container at each interchange (e.g. trucker, railroad, ocean carrier) check and record the seal and its condition upon receipt, and c) a requirement that no loaded container be stowed aboard a vessel without an intact, conforming seal. This would ensure a more secure chain of custody, but not prevent every terrorist act from being committed, since tampering could still go undetected.

· Some new seal and tamper detection technology is very expensive. The government should carefully weigh the additional cost against what is prudent to minimize container tampering.

Government Initiative Ten

Access to secure areas within U.S. ports will be restricted through a worker credentialing program and background checks.

Issues

· Labor leaders consider criminal background checks and limits on port area access to be intrusive.

· The type of worker security screening and certification varies between the different pieces of legislation and initiatives.

Recommendations

· Access limits must be more clearly defined to determine what areas of the port are considered "security sensitive areas."

· A national ID card system should be established for port workers, truck drivers, and others who work in port areas, not just "security sensitive areas." A card issued to workers by each port is not effective and efficient.

· Criteria for conducting background checks should be more clearly defined.

Government Initiative Eleven

C-TPAT links the low-risk importer designation to a low-security risk designation.

Issues

· An importer can be low-risk in terms of compliance with U.S. Customs trade regulations, however, they may not have a secure supply chain, and vice versa. U.S. Customs stated that if a low-risk importer is determined to be a high security risk or chooses not to participate in C-TPAT, then U.S. Customs could revoke the company’s low-risk importer designation. Linking the two types of risks is unfair.

· U.S. Customs stated that C-TPAT is a voluntary program. However, it publicized the fact that importers who participate in C-TPAT will receive preferential treatment in processing their shipments into the U.S. If an importer is not party to C-TPAT, its low-risk status may be adversely affected. The importer may then be subject to more thorough investigation, cargo exams (for which the importer will have to pay), and delays in customs release.

· C-TPAT is in beta-test currently with six large importers and U.S. Customs is in the process of processing applications from many other importers having low-risk designation. In the letters U.S. Customs recently sent to these low-risk importers inviting them to participate in C-TPAT, U.S. Customs gave them thirty days to complete the required application and questionnaire. This is onerous and can be interpreted as forcing importers to join or be subject to cargo exams and delays.

· U.S. Customs announced that after applications from importers are processed, the next phases of C-TPAT will extend benefits to large carriers, and then large brokers, which implies preference and a competitive edge will be given to big, well-known companies. How will U.S. Customs define what a large broker or carrier is? Will U.S. Customs consider integrators such as UPS and FedEx as carriers?

· C-TPAT guidelines were recently published on the U.S. Customs website, and various groups have provided feedback on how to improve these guidelines. U.S. Customs is now evaluating these suggestions. Because the guidelines are in a state of flux, it is difficult for importers to develop internal programs to secure their supply chains without the risk of having to revise these procedures later.

Recommendations

· U.S. Customs should not make the low-risk importer designation dependant upon the importer being a low security risk. The two programs should be operated independently.

· Participation in C-TPAT should be truly voluntary, and companies should not be faced with increased exams and delays in customs clearance if they chose not to or are unable to participate.

· U.S. Customs should give importers 90 days to complete the Supply Chain Security Profile Questionnaire rather than 30 days.

· Smaller carriers and brokers should not be disadvantaged in the interim until U.S. Customs can certify them under C-TPAT.

· U.S. Customs and other federal agencies should use import data to determine the level of risk and conduct investigations and exams based on strict criteria.

· U.S. Customs should invite more feedback from the industry and use these suggestions to finalize the rules of C-TPAT in a reasonable timeframe. Until such time, participation in C-TPAT should be completely voluntary, and more frequent investigations and container exams should be done only in cases when the risk assessment clearly shows suspicious container activity.

Acronym Key

C-TPAT Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism Initiative – A recently introduced U.S. Customs program designed to encourage importers to better secure their supply chain.

ACS Automated Commercial System – U.S. Customs’ existing system for processing import entries for immediate release. Risk assessment is performed within the Selectivity Module.

ACE Automated Commercial Environment – The new U.S. Customs system now under development to replace ACS.

MPF Merchandise Processing Fee – The administrative fee levied upon importers during the customs clearance process intended to go directly to U.S. Customs for its use. The MPF is 0.21% of the value of the imported product. The federal government has used the MPF for other purposes. The commercial trade is currently disputing this unintended use and its possible extension past the 2003 expiration date.

ITDS International Trade Data System – A module of ACE that is designed to share data with other government agencies.

AMS Automated Manifest System – The system ocean carriers use to transmit vessel manifest data electronically to U.S. Customs.

HTS The Harmonized Tariff Schedule used nationally and internationally to classify product for duty and quota determination purposes, with chapters divided by commodity.